Matt Armstrong <marmstrong@google.com> writes: >> Understood. If you manage to bisect the commit that introduces the >> problem (I suspect the rearrangement to support gmime-3.0, but you never >> know), that might be helpful. > > David, your suspicions may have been correct. The bisect came up with > the following commit. > > 1fdc08d0ffab9b211861de5d148d0a79eae840bc is the first bad commit > commit 1fdc08d0ffab9b211861de5d148d0a79eae840bc > Author: David Bremner <david@tethera.net> > Date: Sun Jul 16 01:01:43 2017 +0200 > > cli/crypto: treat failure to create a crypto context as fatal. > > Silently ignoring signed/encrypted parts seems like the wrong idea, > and it also complicates future gmime-3.0 compatibility changes. Do the messages in question actually verify or decrypt with the code before this commit, or does notmuch just silently ignore a gmime failure? Not that I'm claiming SIGSEGV is an appropriate error reporting mechanism ;). d _______________________________________________ notmuch mailing list notmuch@notmuchmail.org https://notmuchmail.org/mailman/listinfo/notmuch